Reforming Regulation in the Markets for Home Loans by Janger, Edward J & Block-Lieb, Susan
Brooklyn Law School
BrooklynWorks
Faculty Scholarship
3-2011
Reforming Regulation in the Markets for Home
Loans
Edward J. Janger
Brooklyn Law School, edward.janger@yale.edu
Susan Block-Lieb
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons, Contracts Commons, and the Other Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
38 Fordham Urb. L. J. 681 (2010-2011)
REFORMING REGULATION IN THE MARKETS
FOR HOME LOANS
Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger*
Introduction ............................................................................................... 681
I. C urrent E vents ..................................................................................... 684
A . The M iller B ill ......................................................................... 686
1. Appropriateness, Disclosure, and Assignee Liability ........ 686
2. H igh-Cost M ortgages ......................................................... 690
3. H ousing Counseling ........................................................... 691
4. Mortgage Servicing and Appraisal Activities .................... 691
B. The Financial Product Safety Commission ............................. 692
C . The Frank B ill .......................................................................... 694
D . The D odd B ill .......................................................................... 695
E. The Dodd-Frank Bill Emerges From the Conference
C om m ittee ............................................................................... 698
F . In Sum ..................................................................................... 699
II. Location, Location, Location ............................................................. 699
A. The Institutional Location of the Bureau and its
Signifi cance ............................................................................. 700
B. Rulemaking Authority: Interactions Between the Bureau
and Other Regulatory Agencies ............................................... 701
C . A B alancing A ct ...................................................................... 710
III. Substance: Provisions From the Mortgage Reform and the Anti-
Predatory Lending A ct .................................................................... 712
C onclusion ................................................................................................. 7 19
INTRODUCTION
The recent financial crisis has been variously explained as a crisis of fi-
nancial gatekeepers, a crisis of consumer borrowing, and a crisis of unregu-
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lated and non-transparent systemic risk. It was all of those things, and
more. The 2008 financial crisis highlighted the interdependence of con-
sumer protection, safety, and soundness, and the costs associated with unal-
loyed solicitude for liquidity. In earlier articles, we retell the story of how
the securitization of residential mortgages pumped up the level of risk in
the financial system and turned lenders into marketers. We focused pri-
marily on how these innovations encouraged consumer overleverage in the
market for home loans.' Market incentives were, on their own, insufficient
to restrain either lenders' or borrowers' decisionmaking. 2  These cata-
strophic results of aggressive marketing of residential mortgages credit de-
monstrates the need for effective consumer protection and consumer educa-
tion-not just to protect consumers, but also to protect the integrity of the
capital markets.
In this Article, we explore the content and institutional context for re-
cently revised regulation of the markets for residential mortgages. We pro-
pose a market-sensitive reading of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (the "Act" or the "Dodd-Frank Act"),3 and suggest that the
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (the "Bureau") created under the
Act should be understood to balance consumer protection with concerns for
the liquidity, safety, and soundness of the financial markets. In particular,
we argue that the Act has the potential to create a regulatory architecture
that protects both consumers and the capital markets by distinguishing be-
tween financial products that can safely be financed through the capital
markets and those that pose greater risks and should, by design, be more
illiquid. This coordinated architecture can be implemented, we believe, by
the new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection through its related pow-
ers to prohibit unfair lending practices, promulgate safe harbor notices, and
implement certain minimum mortgage origination standards. However, the
devil will be in the details-both substantive and institutional-and, in our
view, the new Bureau will have to flex its rulemaking muscle a bit to fully
implement that vision.
With regard to institutional context, our focus is the newly created Bu-
reau of Consumer Financial Protection. This new agency presents an op-
portunity for an improvement over episodic consumer financial protection
1. See Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, Demand-Side Gatekeepers in the Marketfor Home Loans, 82 TEMP. L. REv. 465 (2010). We also argued that gatekeepers could not
be relied upon to accomplish this same result. Id.
2. Edward J. Janger & Susan Block-Lieb, Consumer Credit and Competition: The Puz-
zle of Competitive Credit Markets, 6 EuRo. COMPETITION J. 68 (2010), available at http://
papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstractid=1665140.
3. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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legislation. Congress historically has been unable to resolve issues of con-
sumer protection without heavy involvement from industry actors who,
more often than not, either squelch reform efforts or steer legislation to-
ward non-prescriptive forms of regulation. The Bureau has the potential,
particularly with its location in the Federal Reserve System, to use its regu-
latory authority in a balanced way that considers both the market exigen-
cies of consumer finance and the realities of consumer decisionmaking.
As to substance, we primarily discuss the implications of prescriptive
regulation of predatory mortgages found in the Dodd-Frank Act. More
than simply granting a newly created Bureau of Consumer Financial Pro-
tection the authority to regulate the market for home loans, these provisions
establish federal minimum guidelines for mortgage originators, creditors,
and (most importantly) their assignees. While industry critics complained
that earlier iterations of these provisions would have prevented resuscita-
tion of the still sputtering secondary market in residential mortgages, we
are critical of these reforms from a slightly different perspective. The re-
forms are calculated to increase the liquidity of non-predatory home loans
(and, thus, the strengthening of the market for residential mortgage-backed
securities from its current moribund levels), while limiting the marketabili-
ty of non-standard and potentially predatory loans. In our view, unless the
Bureau strengthens these provisions through its authority to create standar-
dized forms, prescribe disclosure, and promulgate regulations to prevent
unfair, deceptive, and abusive mortgage terms, they will fail to fulfill their
potential as a sorting mechanism.
Part I of this Article compares and contrasts House and Senate bills pro-
posed (and/or passed), in the wake of the current financial crisis, both to re-
configure the market for home loans and re-regulate much of the financial
services markets. This Part concludes by summarizing the reconciliation of
the two bills achieved by the Dodd-Frank Act that combined and modified
these earlier proposals. The Act combined the specific statutory protec-
tions of earlier legislative proposals with a broad grant of regulatory au-
thority to a new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. We believe that
the Dodd-Frank Act holds out the possibility (realizable through use of the
Bureau's rulemaking authority) of a coordinated and systematized integra-
tion of the approaches discussed in those statutes. In Part II, we read Title
X of the statute carefully, with one eye on what the statute says about its
scope and the other on the Bureau's structural placement within the Federal
Reserve. Moving from the creation of the Bureau and its scope of authori-
ty, Part III turns to Title XIV of the Act, which contains provisions from
the Miller and Frank Bills (precursors to the Dodd-Frank Act) intended to
regulate predatory mortgages. Although these provisions are not as strong-
ly protective of consumers in the Dodd-Frank Act as they had been in the
FORDHAM URB. L. J
Miller and Frank Bills, or as we would like them to be, their inclusion in
the Act clarifies the Bureau's scope of jurisdiction over residential mort-
gage loans and solidifies the importance of consumer protection in the
market for home loans. We conclude by justifying our conclusion that the
Act provides a coordinated regulatory architecture and shows how the grant
of regulatory authority contained in the Dodd-Frank Act could be used to
implement this balanced approach.
I. CURRENT EVENTS
The Dodd-Frank Act took two years for Congress to enact because con-
sumer advocates and industry interests debated how best to respond to the
sub-prime mortgage crisis. Initially, proponents of regulatory reform pro-
posed legislation to regulate or proscribe certain consumer financial prod-
ucts.4 Opponents to regulatory reform argued that attempts to weed out bad
actors and products would snuff out credit opportunities for the deserving,
and thus that consumer protection legislation would both limit the liquidity
of consumer debt and stifle product innovation.5 In our view, the Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, signed by President Obama
on July 21, 2010, comes close to satisfying both sets of substantive con-
cerns, but much of its success rests on how it is implemented through ad-
ministrative rulemaking.
Securitization of home mortgages offered considerable benefits for cer-
tain borrowers. Access to capital markets financing reduced the cost of
certain loans, and hence provided an interest rate advantage. This advan-
tage, however, came with attendant risks. Capital markets borrowers relied
heavily on gatekeepers to ensure that the borrowers would have the ability
to repay the loans, that the value of the property was as represented, and
that the borrower would not have defenses to enforcement. This reliance
on gatekeepers created opportunities for abuse by mortgage originators.
That abuse took the shape of poor loan origination practices, loan terms
that were unsuitable for the particular borrower, and loans that the borrow-
er had no meaningfil ability to repay. These risks were greatest with non-
standard mortgages, and would have been significantly reduced where a
lender was making the loan as an investment for its own account. The goal
of the architecture articulated in the bills that preceded Dodd-Frank was to
limit the types of mortgages that would have access to securitization to
those that were safest. As enacted, these protections were significantly wa-
4. See infra notes 10-46 and accompanying text.
5. Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, H.R. 1728, 111th Cong. (lst
Sess. 2009).
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tered down. Nevertheless, because enforcement was entrusted to the Bu-
reau, and the Bureau was also granted rulemaking power, we are hopeful
that an effective sorting architecture is still possible.
This Part discusses the various legislative proposals relating to home
mortgages that formed the DNA for much of what became the Dodd-Frank
Act. The subprime mortgage crisis had prompted members of Congress to
introduce a wide range of regulatory proposals in both the 110th and 111 th
Congresses, and while several of these bills passed the House, none of
them were adopted by the Senate until well after administrations changed
in 2008. Although many bills had been introduced in the House and Se-
nate, we focus primarily on the Miller and Frank Bills in the House and the
Dodd Bill in the Senate.
First, H.R. 1728, a bill introduced in the 111 th Congress by North Caro-
lina Representative Brad Miller (the "Miller Bill"), looked to regulate the
marketers of mortgages through an approach aimed at mortgage brokers
and other mortgage originators-requiring their licensing, mandating dis-
closure, and holding them accountable should they help originate a mort-
gage that was unsuitable for the borrower at the time it was originated.6
Another proposal advocated the creation of a federal consumer financial
products safety commission that would act as a novel form of demand-side
gatekeeper. Professors Elizabeth Warren and Oren Bar-Gill first proposed
this idea in a 2008 law review article. 7 That idea became the template for
the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009.8
By the latter part of 2009, Massachusetts Representative Barney Frank,
Chair of the House Financial Services Committee, introduced H.R. 4173,
which combined portions of the Miller Bill and the Consumer Financial
Protection Agency Act with proposals to re-regulate the financial services
industries and the regulatory agencies in charge of these industries (the
"Frank Bill"). Although the Frank Bill exceeded 1800 pages, it did not
contain a proposal to modify the Bankruptcy Code to enable consumer bor-
rowers to write down the principal on their home loans in the context of a
Chapter 13 debt repayment plan. A bankruptcy mortgage modification bill
6. H.R. 3915, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2008); H.R. 1728, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
Unlike state legislation, this federal proposal was careful not to create fiduciary obligations
for mortgage originators; it also carved out "safe harbor" provisions that would have pro-
tected mortgage originators, creditors, and assignees from liability if they used a "qualified
conforming mortgage." Id.
7. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1
(2008).
8. Helping Families Save Their Homes Act, H.R. 3126, 111 th Cong. (1 st Sess. 2009);
Financial Product Safety Commission Act, H.R. 1705, 111 th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); S. 566,
111 th Cong. (lst Sess. 2009).
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had, on its own, passed the House more than once, only to meet the full
wrath of industry lobbyists (and some academics) who described the
enactment of this bill as surely leading to financial armageddon. 9 The
Frank Bill passed the House on December 11, 2009.
Faced with the Miller and Frank Bills enrolled in the Senate, Christopher
Dodd, the senior Senator from Connecticut and Chair of the Senate Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, introduced S. 3217 to the
Senate on April 15, 2010 (the "Dodd Bill"). The Dodd Bill incorporated
much of the Frank Bill, but omitted or revised several key aspects. First, S.
3217 omitted the provisions that regulated the terms of mortgages and that
had survived in both the Miller and Frank Bills. Second, the Dodd Bill
would have created an entity specifically intended to provide consumer
protection relating to financial products, but unlike the Frank Bill, which
would have created the consumer protection entity as an independent agen-
cy, the Dodd Bill created an entity constituting a "bureau" within the Fed-
eral Reserve System.
We discuss each piece of pending legislation in turn, but given the bills'
lengths, focus primarily on the provisions that affect the markets for home
loans.
A. The Miller Bill
1. Appropriateness, Disclosure, and Assignee Liability
The Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, sponsored by
Representative Miller, 10 would have required mortgage originators (a de-
fined term that would include "any person" who "takes a residential mort-
gage loan application," "assists a consumer in obtaining or applying" for
such a loan, or "offers or negotiates the terms" of a residential mortgage
loan)1' to be qualified, registered, and licensed as a mortgage originator
9. H.R. 1106, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009). The proposal to permit modification of
residential mortgages in bankruptcy pursuant to a case under Chapter 13 of the Code had
passed the House in March 2009 before introduction of the Frank Bill, but was never
enacted in the Senate. For acerbic academic debate on the proposal, see Adam J. Levitin,Back to the Future with Chapter 13: A Response to Professor Scarberry, 37 PEPP. L. REv.
1261 (2010); Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages
in Bankruptcy, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 565; Mark S. Scarberry, A Critique of CongressionalProposals to Permit Modification of Home Mortgages in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, 37 PEPP.
L. REv. 635 (2010); Mark S. Scarberry, Mortgage Wars Episode V-The Empiricist Strikes
Back (Or Out): A Reply to Professor Levitin's Response, 37 PEPP. L. REv. 1277 (2010).
10. H.R. 3915; H.R. 1728.
11. H.R. 1728 § 101.
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under state or federal law. 12 More importantly, mortgage originators would
have been required by the legislation to "diligently work to present the con-
sumer with a range of residential mortgage loan products," each of which is
"appropriate to the consumer's existing circumstances, based on informa-
tion known by, or obtained in good faith by, the originator." 13 The origina-
tor would also have been required to "make full, complete and timely dis-
closure" to consumer borrowers of "the comparative costs and benefits of
each residential mortgage loan product offered, discussed, or referred to by
the originator,"'14 and to disclose "the nature of the originator's relation-
ship" to the consumer and "any relevant conflicts of interest" to the con-
sumer.
15
The Miller Bill would have presumed that a mortgage was "appropriate"
if the mortgage originator determines "in good faith, based on then existing
information and without undergoing a full underwriting process," that the
consumer has a reasonable ability to repay, that the mortgage loan does not
have predatory characteristics, and that she receives a net tangible benefit
(applicable primarily to refinancing).16
In addition, the Miller Bill would have banned yield spread premiums
and other compensation that could cause originators to "steer" mortgage
applicants toward costlier mortgages.17 It would have amended the Truth
In Lending Act (TILA) to provide that, "[fjor any mortgage loan, the ag-
gregate amount of direct and indirect compensation from all sources per-
mitted to a mortgage originator may not vary based on the terms of the loan
(other than the amount of the principal)."' 8
Under the Miller Bill, a mortgage originator that violated these mortgage
loan origination standards would have been liable to a consumer borrower
12. Id. § 102 (adding section 129B to the Truth in Lending Act regarding mortgage ori-
ginators' "duty of care"). Many states already require the registration or licensure of mort-
gage brokers. Moreover, Congress passed the Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage
Licensing Act (referred to as the S.A.F.E. Act). The S.A.F.E. Act became law as a part of
the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289.
13. H.R. 1728 § 102.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. (defining "appropriate loan product" for purposes of new section 129B(b)(2)(B)).
The Miller Bill also would have authorized the Federal Reserve, OCC, OTS, NCUA, and
other banking agencies (the "Agencies") to promulgate regulations implementing these sta-
tutory requirements, including further detail on what constitutes an "appropriate" mortgage
for these purposes. Id. (adding sections 129B(b)(4) and (5)).
17. Id. § 103.
18. Id.
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for an amount equal to the actual damages or three times the brokers' fee
plus litigation costs (including attorneys' fees). 9
The Miller Bill would have done more than set mortgage origination
standards. It also would have set federal minimum standards for mortgag-
es, applicable more generally to creditors, their assignees, and securitizers.
The Miller Bill would have required a creditor to make a reasonable, good
faith determination, at the time the mortgage is entered into, that: (i) the
consumer had a reasonable ability to repay the mortgage loan at a fully in-
dexed, fully amortizing rate, based on verified and documented information
on the consumer's credit history, current and expected income, debt-to-
income ratio, and other financial resources;2 ° and (ii) any refinancing will
provide a net tangible benefit to the consumer based on information known
or obtained in good faith by the creditor.2 ' Verification of the consumer's
income would have been required by these provisions, which likely were
intended to rid the market of the no-income, no asset ("NINA") and no-
income, no-job, no-asset verification ("NINJA") mortgage loans that had
been prevalent in 2007 and 2008 markets.
Perhaps more important than these minimum standards were the "assig-
nee liability" provisions that would have been adopted in the Miller Bill.
These provisions targeted the "originate-to-distribute" model of mortgage
financing that had come to dominate the market for home loans. The Mil-
ler Bill contained remedies that would have permitted assertion of its
"ability to pay" standards against an assignee or securitizer of the mort-
gage.22 In the absence of these assignee liability provisions, the "sale" of
mortgages into a securitization vehicle might well have insulated assignees
from liability for violation of the proposed minimum federal standards un-
der the "holder in due course" doctrine. Under this doctrine, assignees of
mortgages that purchase for value and in good faith take the mortgages free
of property claims to the instrument and contractual defenses to enforce-
ment that could have been asserted against the originator of the mortgage
(often a mortgage broker).23 This freedom from defenses and claims is a
legal liquidity enhancement that is thought to be essential to the origina-
19. Id. § 104. Because mortgage brokers are often relatively thinly capitalized entities,
this recourse would have been an imperfect remedy, especially where a particular broker
was engaged in widespread predation.
20. Id. § 201.
21. Id. § 202. The Bill further provides that a loan for which the cost of refinancing ex-
ceeds the newly advanced principal presumptively does not provide "net tangible benefit,"
but that the Agencies will have jurisdiction to proscribe regulations further detailing "net
tangible benefit." Id.
22. Id. §§ 203, 204.
23. U.C.C. § 3-302 (2002).
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tor's ability to sell the loan to a securitization pool. 24 The Miller Bill
would have imposed minimum standards on not only all mortgage credi-
tors, but also all assignees and securitizers of these residential mortgages.
The federal minimum standards would have applied regardless of whether
the mortgage had been sold, assigned, or securitized.25 As a result, capital
markets investors would have been at risk, if mortgage lenders had in-
cluded in a securitization pool mortgages that violated the requirement that
creditors make a reasonable, good faith determination of consumers' "abili-
ty to pay" the loan and the "net tangible benefit" of residential mortgage
refinancings. The holder in due course doctrine would not have insulated
assignees and securitizers from these federal defenses if raised by consum-
ers, following enactment of these provisions of the Miller Bill.
26
These assignee liability provisions in the Miller Bill were not designed
to put an end to securitization, but instead to serve a sorting function. More
than simply enable liability to be asserted against creditors, assignees, and
securitizers, the Miller Bill also provided for a limited safe harbor for cer-
tain "qualified mortgages." 27 Assignee liability would not have applied to
these "qualified mortgages" because "qualified mortgages" presumptively
satisfied the "ability to repay" and "net tangible benefit" standards.
28
"Qualified mortgages" were defined in the Miller Bill as a mortgage that
"does not allow a consumer to defer payment of principal or interest," and,
thus, was neither a negatively amortizing mortgage nor a mortgage with a
"balloon payment" (defined as a scheduled payment that is more than twice
as large as the average of earlier scheduled payments). "[Q]ualified mort-
gages" also would have been defined to exclude certain higher-cost mort-
gages, mortgages with points and fees in excess of two percent of the total
loan amount, and mortgages with a term in excess of thirty years.29 Addi-
tionally, "[q]ualified mortgages" would have been required to satisfy a
24. See, e.g., Edward J. Janger, The Costs of Liquidity Enhancement, 4 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 39, 55-56 (2009); Albert J. Rosenthal, Negotiability-Who Needs It?, 71 Co-
LUM. L. REv. 375,377 (1971).
25. H.R. 1728 §§ 201, 202.
26. Id.
27. Id. § 203. The Miller Bill defined "qualified mortgages," subject to this rebuttable
presumption of satisfaction of the statutory requirements, as loans for which: (i) the Annual
Percentage Rate does not exceed an average prime offer rate, published by the Federal Re-
serve, by more than 1.5 percentage points for a first lien and 3.5 percentage points for a
second or other subordinate lien; (ii) the borrowers' income and financial resources are veri-
fied; (iii) the underwriting process is based on a fully-indexed rate; (iv) the loan meets a
combined debt-to-income test to be prescribed by the Agencies; and (v) the loan has a fixed
rate term of not less than or more than thirty years. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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debt-to-income ratio to be set by regulation, with the obligors' income and
financial resources used to satisfy this ratio both verified and docu-
mented.3°
The penalties in the Miller Bill were quite harsh. "Creditors" violating
the "ability to repay" or "net tangible benefit" standards (and who could
not establish that the mortgages at issue were "qualified mortgages") would
have been liable for rescission plus costs of litigation (including attorneys'
fees), unless the creditor "cured" within ninety days by means of a no-cost
modification or refinancing of the loan.3 1 "Creditors" subject to these re-
medies would have included transferees, assignees, or securitizers of the
mortgage loan, although class action suits would not have been permitted.32
Moreover, this right of action also would have acted as a defense or coun-
terclaim to any judicial or non-judicial foreclosure action brought against a
consumer borrower.33  In addition, the assignee liability provisions pro-
vided in the Miller Bill would have preempted state laws providing addi-
tional remedies against any assignee, securitizer, or securitization vehicle,
but would not have preempted more general state law provisions, such as
laws regarding fraud, misrepresentation, deceptive practices, false advertis-
ing, or civil rights laws.34
2. High-Cost Mortgages
The Miller Bill would have expanded the scope of the Home Owners'
Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) by revising the definition of high-cost
mortgages to include purchase money loans, construction loans, and open-
end loans, all of which are currently excluded under the statute.35 It would
have conformed the trigger points for determining whether a mortgage is
30. Id.
31. Id. § 204.
32. Id. The Miller Bill expressly excluded from liability the securitization vehicles that
hold the loan, the loan pools, purchasers of the securitization vehicles, and investors in any
instrument that represents an interest in such pool. Id. It also would have exempted from
liability assignees or securitizers that had "exercised reasonable due diligence in complying
with" these minimum federal requirements. Id.
33. Id. §§ 204, 205.
34. Id. § 208. The Miller Bill also would have required the Department of Housing and
Urban Development to provide "a full range of foreclosure legal assistance to low and mod-
erate income homeowners and tenants related to home ownership preservation, home forec-
losure preservation, and tenancy associated with home foreclosure." Id § 216. In addition,
it provided for the protection of certain tenants in the event of the foreclosure of leased pre-
mises that take place after the effective date of the legislation. Id. § 220.
35. Id. § 302.
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high-cost in the 2009 revisions to Regulation Z-the HOEPA Rules36-as
well as the substantive prohibitions in HOEPA.
3 7
3. Housing Counseling
In addition to imposing responsibilities on mortgage originators and as-
signee liability on creditors and their assigns, providing protections for te-
nants in the context of foreclosures, and expanding current regulation so
that it covers a far broader swath of sub-prime mortgages and prohibits
predatory practices rather than simply requiring their disclosure, the Miller
Bill would have created a new Office of Housing Counseling (OHC).38
The OHC would have provided homeownership counseling, rental housing
counseling, and education under standards to be set by the U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and counselors certified by
HUD. 39 Most importantly, the Bill authorized appropriations to the Secre-
tary of HUD for these purposes.
40
4. Mortgage Servicing and Appraisal Activities
The Miller Bill would have required creditors to establish an escrow for
the payment of taxes and certain insurance premiums and other payments,
4 1
or provide enhanced notice to consumers who waive escrow services.42 It
would have amended the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RES-
PA)43 to limit the circumstances requiring force-placed hazard insurance44
and TILA regarding the application of borrowers' payments.45 Finally, the
Bill sought to regulate real estate appraisals made in connection with cer-
tain home loans.46
36. Id.; see also Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 et seq. (2010).
37. H.R. 1728 §§ 302, 303; see also 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 et seq.
38. H.R. 1728 § 402.
39. Id. § 403.
40. Id. § 404.
41. Id. § 501.
42. Id. § 502.
43. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1996, 12 U.S.C. § 2605 et seq. (2006).
44. H.R. 1728 § 503; see also James M. Cain, Financial Institution Insurance Activi-
ties-A New 2001 Odyssey Begins, 57 Bus. LAW. 1357, 1368 (2002) (defining "force-placed
hazard insurance" as "property and casualty insurance required by a lender to protect colla-
teral securing a loan").
45. H.R. 1728 § 504.
46. Id. §§ 601-06.
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B. The Financial Product Safety Commission
Under prior law, various federal and state political actors had jurisdic-
tion to regulate consumer credit markets, including the market for home
loans.47 Each of the federal regulators with jurisdiction over financial insti-
tutions-the Federal Reserve Board (the "Board" or the "Fed"), the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS), and the National Credit Union Authority (NCUA)-had regulatory,
monitoring, and enforcement authority over unfair and deceptive financial
products issued by those institutions. The Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) had similar authority over non-depository members of the financial
services industry.48 HUD had some regulatory jurisdiction over residential
mortgages and was the regulator with supervisory jurisdiction over Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as indirect authority over residential mort-
gage terms. Whether state attorneys' general offices and state banking reg-
ulators had jurisdiction over consumer financial protection was an issue on
which federal and state regulators differed; the Supreme Court weighed in
from time to time on whether federal banking and other laws preempted
state actors' consumer protection and other regulatory efforts.4 9
This balkanization left many with authority over, but none with clear re-
sponsibility for, regulation of financial products. This state of affairs led
Professors Elizabeth Warren and Oren Bar-Gill to propose that a single,
centralized, Financial Products Safety Commission be created by Con-
gress.5" Inspired in large part by this academic work, bills were introduced
in both the Senate and House to create a Financial Product Safety Commis-
sion (FPSC or the "Commission") that would have jurisdiction to regulate
the terms and types of financial products available to consumers.51 In these
bills, the FPSC would have been created as an independent agency.52 In
one iteration of these proposals, the Commission was to be directed by a
47. See Regulatory Restructuring: Safeguarding Consumer Protection and the Role of
the Federal Reserve: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Monetary Policy and
Tech. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 18-20 (2009) [hereinafter Regulatory
Restructuring] (statement of Patricia A. McCoy, Dir., Ins. Law Ctr., Univ. of Conn. Law
Sch.), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcsdem/mccoyhouse
_testimonyhearingjuly_16 2009.pdf; see also Ann Graham, The Consumer Financial
Protection Agency: Love It or Hate It, U.S. Financial Regulation Needs It, 55 VILE. L. REv.
603,609 (2010).
48. Regulatory Restructuring, supra note 47.
49. See generally Watters v. Wachovia, 550 U.S. 1 (2007); Barnett Bank. of Marion Cn-
ty. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
50. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
51. See supra notes 6-9.
52. H.R. 1705, llth Cong. § 4(a)(1) (lst Sess. 2009); S. 566, 111th Cong. § 4(a)(1)
(1st Sess. 2009).
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five-person board of commissioners, appointed with staggered terms, and
led by a chairperson who would be appointed by the President with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate.53 The Commission would have been vested
with authority to "minimize unreasonable consumer risk associated with
buying and using consumer financial products," as well as to "collect, in-
vestigate, resolve, and inform the public about consumer complaints re-
garding consumer financial products." 54  The Commission would have
been directed to "promulgate consumer financial product safety rules
that.., ban abusive, fraudulent, unfair, deceptive, predatory, anticompeti-
tive, or otherwise anti-consumer practices, products or product features," as
well as to provide related educational and other support services. 55 These
bills would have left in place other federal agencies with concurrent juris-
diction, but gave the FPSC the first option on enforcement actions, and
made clear that FPSC rules would prevail over other rules and regulations
if the competing rule "conflicts with a rule promulgated by the Commis-
sion" and "is less protective of consumers" than the Commission rule.
56
Similarly, these bills would have limited pre-emption of state law and, in-
deed, would have required the new Commission to establish a program for
coordinating with state and local authorities in "the administration and en-
forcement of this Act."57
Representative Barney Frank introduced his own bill, H.R. 3126, to es-
tablish a Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA).58 H.R. 3126 was
built on the earlier bills and, at ten times the length of the earlier bills, pro-
vided more detail about the composition of the new Agency but with a
more open-ended, less detailed statement of the rulemaking objectives of
the Agency. Moreover, unlike the earlier bills, which envisioned an inde-
pendent agency that worked in tandem with other existing federal agencies
and offices having jurisdiction over consumer financial products, the CFPA
in H.R. 3126 "shall have the exclusive authority to prescribe regulations,
issue guidance, conduct examinations, require reports, or issue exemp-
tions."59 Unlike the earlier bills, H.R. 3126 contained more nuanced pre-
emption provisions (and maybe less limited) regarding the extent to which
state legislators and executives could regulate and bring enforcement ac-
tions against banks and other financial entities subject to federal regulation.
53. H.R. 1705 § 4(a)(2); S. 566 § 4(a)(2).
54. H.R. 1705 § 5(a)(1), (7); S. 566 § 5(a)(1), (7).
55. H.R. 1705 § 5(b)(1)(A); S. 566 § 5(b)(1)(A).
56. H.R. 1705 § 6(b); S. 566 § 6(b).
57. H.R. 1705 § 8(b)(2)(A); S. 566 § 8(b)(2)(A).
58. H.R. 3126, 111 th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
59. Id. at § 122(d).
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C. The Frank Bill
By the time Representative Frank introduced H.R. 4173, The Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, the bill had morphed into
omnibus legislation that combined provisions from the Miller Bill to regu-
late predatory mortgages (appropriateness, disclosure, and assignee liabili-
ty), provisions from Frank's earlier H.R. 3126 to create a Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Agency, 60 and provisions from other pending legislation to
re-regulate the financial services markets. For example, the Frank Bill
would have folded the OTS and OCC into one organization, still called the
OCC;61 it would have created a Financial Stability Council comprised of all
of the financial regulators and housed in the Federal Reserve System;62
and, it would have established a process for addressing large, failing unre-
gulated financial institutions.63 It would have given shareholders an advi-
sory vote on executive compensation, enabled regulators to ban certain
risky compensation practices, and, in any event, required covered financial
industries to disclose incentive-based compensation structures. 6' It would
have expanded the regulatory authority of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, in-
cluding granting the SEC authority over hedge funds and certain deriva-
tives transactions. 65
Incorporating the Credit Risk Retention Act,66 the Frank Bill would have
required the "appropriate agencies" to promulgate regulations requiring
"any creditor that makes a loan to retain an economic interest in a material
portion of the credit risk of any such loan that the creditor transfers, sells,
or conveys to a third party," and "any securitizer of asset-backed securities
.. to retain an economic interest in a material portion of any such asset
used to back an issuance of securities." 67 It further directed that these regu-
60. There were some changes made to the CFPA proposals that ended up in the Frank
Bill. For example, it provides that the Federal Reserve System would pay the budget of the
Agency. The CFPA would not have jurisdiction over "small institutions," defined as banks
holding less than $10 billion in deposits and credit unions with less than $1.5 billion in de-
posits. The NCUA would continue to exist under the Frank Bill, but the CFPA could oust it
from power under limited circumstances. Neither the SEC nor the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission would fall under the CFPA's oversight. See H.R. 4173, tit. IV, §§
4001-4901 (2009) (enacted Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010)).
61. Id. § 1207.
62. Id. §§ 1001-08.
63. Id. tit. I, §§ 1000-1951.
64. Id. §§ 2001-04.
65. Id. tits. III, V.
66. See H.R. 1731, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); H.R. 3996, 111th Cong. §§ 1501-05
(1st Sess. 2009).
67. H.R. 4173 § 1502(a).
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lations should require retention of five percent "of the credit risk on any
loan that is transferred, sold, or conveyed by such creditor or securitized by
such securitizer," and prohibit the hedging or other transfer of the risk to be
retained.68 The Frank Bill would have allowed these regulators to adopt a
"safe harbor" enabling creditors and securitizers to retain less than this five
percent interest if
the loan that is transferred, sold, or conveyed by such creditor or securi-
tized by such securitizer meets terms, conditions, and characteristics that
are determined by an appropriate agency to reflect loans with reduced
credit risk, such as loans that meet certain interest rate thresholds, loans
that are fully amortizing, and loans that are included in a securitization in
which a third-party purchaser specifically negotiates for the purchase of
the first-loss position and provides due diligence on all individual loans in
the pool prior to the issuance of the asset-backed securities, and retains a
first-loss position.
69
The pre-emption provisions in the Frank Bill were narrower, and perhaps
more nuanced, than those found in the earlier Miller Bill. 7' Not surprising-
ly, perhaps, since the Frank Bill was far broader in scope than the Miller
Bill had been. In the Frank Bill, federal regulators could have pre-empted
state law if the state laws would have a "discriminatory impact on the fed-
erally chartered institutions relative to state chartered institution,"71 the
state law is already pre-empted by other federal legislation, or the federal
regulator responsible for the federally chartered institution determines on a
case-by-case basis that "state consumer financial law prevents, significantly
interferes with, or materially impairs the ability of an institution chartered
as a national bank to engage in the business of banking." 72 This would
need to be shown by "substantial evidence, made on the record of the pro-
ceeding." 73
D. The Dodd Bill
The Frank Bill passed the House in December 2009 and percolated in
the Senate before the Senate acted. It was not until April 15, 2010 that
Senator Dodd introduced S. 3217, the Restoring American Financial Stabil-
ity Act of 2010.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. §§ 4401-10.
71. Id.; see also Broox W. Peterson, The Consumer Financial Protection Agency: Dif-
ferent Ship, Same Chairs?, 28 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP. 1, 8 (2009).
72. H.R. 4173 § 4409.
73. Id.
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Like the Frank Bill, the Dodd Bill was omnibus legislation. In broad-
brush strokes, the Dodd Bill, like the Frank Bill, combined the creation of a
consumer protection entity with complete re-regulation of the financial ser-
vices sector. True to the Senate's failure to react to the Miller Bill when
adopted by the House in 2008 and in the spring of 2009, the Dodd Bill
stripped from the Frank Bill any provisions requiring mortgage originators
to determine the appropriateness or net benefit of a mortgage, provide spe-
cific disclosures to borrowers, or create assignee liability for failure to sa-
tisfy these standards. While presumably these regulatory requirements
might have been intended to be the proper subject for rulemaking by what-
ever consumer protection entity Congress created in the end, the Dodd Bill
itself removed these provisions.
For our purposes, the most important difference between the Frank Bill
and the Dodd Bill (as introduced) is in the nature of the consumer protec-
tion entity that would have been created. Under S. 3217, consumer protec-
tion would have been housed, not in an independent, newly-created agency,
but rather in a "bureau" of the Federal Reserve System. 74 Despite this loca-
tional distinction, the Dodd Bill continued to refer to the Bureau of Con-
sumer Financial Protection (BCFP) as autonomous and independent.75 The
House and Senate Bills also differed in terms of how they would have
structured the consumer protection entity. The Frank Bill would have
created a staggered board of five CFPA commissioners under the leader-
ship of a chairperson. 76 The Dodd Bill instead provided for the appoint-
ment of a Bureau director.77 But the director was to be appointed by the
President, not by the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, and for the
same five-year term that had been specified in the Frank Bill.78 The Dodd
Bill also called for the creation of an Office of Financial Literacy within the
BCFP,79 while the Frank Bill had simply noted the "sense of Congress" re-
garding the importance of financial literacy.8"
There are a number of other differences between the Frank Bill (as it
passed in the House) and the Dodd Bill (as it was introduced). The Frank
Bill would have continued the Fed's supervisory role as central bank over
74. S. 3217, 111 th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
75. Remember, of course, that the Frank Bill had provided for the CFPA's budget to
come out of the Fed's budget, which presumably would not change were consumer protec-
tion housed in a bureau of the Fed.
76. See S. 3217 §§ 4101-10.
77. Restoring American Financial Stability Act, S. 3217, 111 th Cong. § 1013 (2d Sess.
2010).
78. See H.R. 4173 § 4103.
79. S. 3217 § 1013.
80. H.R. 4173 § 4816.
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the entire financial system; the Dodd Bill would have limited the role of the
Fed to financial institutions with assets exceeding fifty billion dollars and
specified institutions on a watch-list, only thirty-six institutions in total.8 '
The Dodd Bill introduced the so-called Volker Rule into the legislation-a
rule allowing regulators to ban proprietary trading at bank holding compa-
nies. These holding companies, which have access to the Fed discount
window, would have been banned from trading in securities on their own
account.82 This rule also would have allowed a cap on the amount of a par-
ticular type of security that a financial firm could hold in its books. While
both the Frank and Dodd Bills had certain provisions requiring regulations
to be promulgated that required creditors and securitizers to retain credit
risk in certain circumstances,83 the provisions on this topic in the Dodd Bill
were more detailed and contained the potential for additional safe harbors
in whatever regulations ultimately were adopted.
The Dodd Bill was introduced in April 2010 and the Senate took up de-
bate nearly immediately. On May 19, 2010, after a number of amendments
to the Bill had been proposed and voted on, Senate majority leadership
called for a vote to end debate on amendments. 84 Although sixty votes
were needed to move the bill to the next stage, only fifty-seven senators
voted to proceed.85 Two democratic senators had declined to vote in favor
of the proposal because they felt the Bill was still not restrictive enough on
the financial services sector. Senator Cantwell, whose amendment on regu-
lating derivatives contracts had been tabled earlier in the week, was among
those who voted with Republicans against the proposal to proceed.8 6 Sena-
tor Feingold indicated that his "no" vote would change only if the Senate
voted to repeal the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and reinstate the regulatory
separation between banking and other financial services. At a press confe-
rence held the following day, Senator Harry Reid, majority whip, assured
"the American people" that a compromise on the derivatives proposal
would be hammered out soon, with a new vote on proceeding to occur
81. Id.; S. 3217 § 177 (as introduced).
82. S. 3217 § 619(g).
83. H.R. 4173 § 1502.
84. 156 CONG. REC. S3974 (May 19, 2010) (statement of Senator Dodd noting presence
of two cloture motions at the desk).
85. Democratic Holdouts Block Financial Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2010, http://deal
book.nytimes.com/2010/05/19/democratic-holdouts-block-fmancial-bill/?scp=3&sq=May%
2019,%202010%20%20Dodd%20Bill&st=cse.
86. Id.
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within days.87 The Bill passed the Senate the next day and a conference
committee was convened.88
Since the Frank Bill and Dodd Bill differed from each other, more work
was required in the House before the law emerged. A conference commit-
tee was created to reconcile the differences between the two bills.89
E. The Dodd-Frank Bill Emerges From the Conference Committee
Because both the House and Senate had adopted legislation to reform the
financial markets and provide consumer financial protection, a bipartisan
conference committee was appointed to resolve the differences in the two
bills-the House's Frank Bill and the Senate's Dodd Bill. Deliberations
proceeded slowly over the summer, sometimes in windowless chambers on
Capitol Hill and sometimes in the bright lights of press conferences held by
lobbyists and others. In the end, the Dodd Bill took roughly center stage in
the Dodd-Frank Act, with one important exception. The Mortgage Reform
and Anti-Predatory Lending Act provisions of the Frank Bill, which traced
their origins to the Miller Bill and had not been present in the Dodd Bill,
re-emerged as Title XIV of the conference committee's report and so Title
XIV of the Dodd-Frank Act.90 While substantially similar to the legislation
that had been proposed in the Miller and Frank Bills in the House, the con-
ference committee made important changes to these provisions before re-
inserting them in the reconciliation of the House and Senate versions of the
legislation. Most of the changes related to the provisions setting minimum
standards for residential mortgages and the assignee liability and remedial
provisions intended to enforce these provisions. In addition, the Dodd-
Frank Act exempted "qualified [residential] mortgages" from the require-
ment that securitizers hold five percent "skin in the game." 9' We leave the
details of these provisions 92 to the next sections.
87. David M. Herszenhom, Senate Fails to Advance Financial Reform Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
May 20, 2010, at B1.
88. 156 CONG. REc. S4078 (May 20, 2010).
89. CONFERENCE REPORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 4172, DODD-FRANK WALL STREET
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, REP. No. 517 (2d Sess. 2010), available at http://
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/R?cpl 11 :FLD010:@1(hr517).
90. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376, tit. XIV-Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act (July 21,
2010).
91. Id.
92. Id. §§ 941-45.
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F. In Sum
We pause here to note the perhaps surprising omnibus nature of the
Dodd-Frank Act's combination of provisions to regulate predatory mort-
gages (and mortgage practices), provisions to create a consumer financial
protection agency, and broad-ranging provisions to regulate the financial
services industry. Each of the three proposals was strongly opposed by the
financial services industry; weaving the three into a single bill would seem
only to concentrate opposition on a bigger target. On the other hand, given
the crisis of 2008, it was clear that some sort of a legislative package
needed to be enacted in response. Opposition was politically dangerous,
and there was probably a sense that there was only the will to enact one sta-
tute. Still, it was a bold and audacious move, premised on the near certain-
ty that there would be one, and only one, opportunity for financial reform
in the Obama Administration.
Putting aside the issue of scope, there remains the question of substance,
and here we were surprised by the conference committee's final report.
The Dodd Bill had stripped from its legislative proposal all prescriptive
regulation in the residential mortgage market. The predatory mortgage
provisions of the Miller Bill (and later in the Frank Bill), which had left the
financial services industry apoplectic with their likelihood for killing inno-
vation and liquidity in the market for home loans, were never a part of the
Dodd Bill. Surprisingly, the conference committee re-inserted these provi-
sions in somewhat watered down form. 9 3 These anti-predatory residential
mortgage provisions provide substantive consumer financial protection
regulation, unlike the remainder of the Act, which is composed almost en-
tirely of provisions that alter the infrastructure but not the substance of con-
sumer financial protection regulation and, more broadly, of regulation of
the financial services sector.
II. LOCATION, LOCATION, LOCATION
While the Act has been presented as a comprehensive regulatory reform,
and while it certainly contains a fair amount of substantive regulation, its
revolutionary nature lies more in its reconfiguration of the regulatory land-
scape. Now, in addition to the Federal Reserve and other bank regulatory
agencies regulating to protect safety and soundness on the supply side, the
demand side will also be filtered through regulation enforced and promul-
gated by the new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.
93. Id. §§ 1400-98.
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A. The Institutional Location of the Bureau and Its Significance
The most significant difference between the House and Senate versions
of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act involved the re-
location of the new entity created to regulate consumer financial protec-
tion.94 In the Frank Bill, consumer financial protection was to occur in an
independent agency, but in the Dodd Bill, consumer financial protection
was shifted to a bureau within the Federal Reserve Board.95
We view the identification of the Bureau's source of funding as indica-
tive of-indeed, as a sort of guarantee of-the Bureau's financial indepen-
dence from political sources. Because the Fed is independent and self-
financed, the Bureau would be beholden only to the Fed and not to Con-
gress or the Executive for funding. Congress cannot cut the Bureau's
budget in future years, or under future Administrations, in precisely the
same way that neither Congress nor the executive branch has the power of
the purse over the Fed. 96 The Fed's financial independence was intention-
ally assured.97 We assume that the Bureau's funding through the Fed was
also intentionally structured to ensure the Bureau's political independence,
rather than to ensure that the Fed could or should control the substance of
any regulation promulgated by it, or the enforcement of any laws or regula-
tions over which the Act grants the Bureau jurisdiction.98
In addition to ensuring funding, placing the CFPB in the Fed has another
advantage over other possible locations. Given the interrelation between
consumer protection, liquidity, and safety and soundness, where Congress
placed the Bureau is critically important to the political and substantive im-
plications of this structural shift. For example, with placement in the FTC,
Congress could have been signaling the preeminence of consumer protec-
tion to the work of the Bureau, and the preeminence of the FTC in the area
of consumer protectionism. This placement also might have been con-
94. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
95. Id.
96. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEX. L. REv. 15, 21 (2010) (noting that the "Banking Act of 1935, which estab-
lished the modem structure of the Federal Reserve, aimed to give the agency more insula-
tion so that it would serve the 'general public interest' and not 'special interests"' (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 74-742, at 1, 6 (1935))).
97. Id But see Gyung-Ho Jeong, Gary J. Miller & Andrew C. Sobel, Political Compro-
mise and Bureaucratic Structure: The Political Origins of the Federal Reserve System, 25
J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 472, 472 (2009) (arguing that "the structural independence of the Fed is
not the result of intentional design but a product of compromise among disparate groups").
98. See Barkow, supra note 96, at 72-79 (discussing structural insularity of Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection and noting that "whether the CFPB succeeds or fails, it is
promising that so much attention was paid to equalizing insulators in the debate over the
agency's creation").
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strued as limiting the occasion for regulation to the need to eradicate decep-
tive, abusive, and otherwise unfair financial product or financial contract
terms, but not more extensive regulatory goals. If, on the other hand, Con-
gress had placed the Bureau as a part of one of the pre-existing agencies for
the regulation of a financial institution, such as within OTS or the OCC, it
most likely would have been signaling something very different-the
preeminence of the safety and soundness of these financial institutions over
consumer protectionism. That regulatory agencies such as the OTS and
OCC had historically thwarted consumer protection regulation as inconsis-
tent with the liquidity and innovativeness of the institutions it supervised
might also have been an indication of Congress' intent to subvert the
strength of the consumer protectionism that the Bureau would have been
empowered to pursue.
But Congress did none of these things. Instead, it placed the Bureau as a
part of the Fed: the most politically independent financial regulator. Im-
portantly, the Fed has primary jurisdiction over systemic risk, at least after
enactment of the Act, and thus has a close eye on the liquidity of the mar-
kets for consumer credit. Embedding the Bureau within the Fed makes it
unlikely that the Bureau can pursue its consumer protectionist goals with-
out also considering the effects of such regulation on the financial market-
place. Thus, positioning the Bureau within the Federal Reserve System
emphasizes the inter-relationship between consumer financial protection
and financial regulation, more generally.
In the next section, we turn to the details of the provisions of the Dodd-
Frank Act that create the new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.
B. Rulemaking Authority: Interactions Between the Bureau and
Other Regulatory Agencies
The Act establishes "an independent bureau" within the Federal Reserve
System,99 "which shall regulate the offering and provision of consumer fi-
nancial products or services under the Federal consumer financial laws."'
00
The powers of the Bureau are defined in this section to include "the estab-
lishment of rules for conducting the general business of the Bureau" and
implementation of "the Federal consumer financial laws through rules, or-
ders, guidance, interpretations, statements of policy, examinations, and en-
forcement actions."101 A detailed statement of the Bureau's "purpose, ob-
99. Dodd-Frank Act, § 1011.
100. Id. § 101 (a). "Federal consumer financial laws" is defined by the Dodd-Frank Act
in section 1002(14).
101. Id § 1012(a)(l), (10).
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jectives and functions" is found in section 1021 of the Act, where the Bu-
reau is directed to implement and "enforce Federal consumer financial law
consistently for the purpose of ensuring that all consumers have access to
markets for consumer financial products and services and that markets for
consumer financial products and services are fair, transparent, and competi-
tive."102
Five objectives are specified: (i) providing consumers "timely and un-
derstandable information so that they can make "responsible decisions
about financial transactions"; (ii) protecting consumers from "unfair, de-
ceptive, or abusive acts and practices and from discrimination"; (iii) identi-
fying and redressing "outdated, unnecessary, or unduly burdensome regula-
tions" to "reduce unwarranted regulatory burdens"; (iv) enforcing the Fed-
Federal consumer financial laws "consistently, without regard to the status
of a person as a depository institution," so as to promote "fair competition";
and (v) ensuring that "markets for consumer financial products and services
operate transparently and efficiently to facilitate access and innovation."'10 3
Should these purposes and objectives be unclear, the Act further details the
primary functions of the Bureau. Like many administrative agencies, the
Bureau holds regulatory responsibility-the responsibility to promulgate
new regulations, but also the responsibility to monitor and enforce com-
pliance with existing regulations. The content of these functions is less
surprising to us than the order in which they are stated, so we quote this
subsection nearly in full:
(c) Functions-The primary functions of the Bureau are-
(1) conducting financial education programs;
(2) collecting, investigating, and responding to consumer complaints;
(3) collecting, researching, monitoring, and publishing information rele-
vant to the functioning of markets for consumer financial products and
services to identify risks to consumers and the proper functioning of such
markets;
(4) subject to sections 1024 through 1026, supervising covered persons
for compliance with Federal consumer financial law, and taking appropri-
ate enforcement action to address violations of Federal consumer financial
law;
(5) issuing rules, orders, and guidance implementing Federal consumer fi-
nancial law; and
102. Id. § 1021(a).
103. Id. § 1021(c)(l)-(6).
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(6) performing such support activities as may be necessary or useful to fa-
cilitate the other functions of the Bureau.104
Placing regulatory authority fourth on the list of the Bureau's functions
may not have been an accident.
The Bureau's rulemaking authority is carefully prescribed within the
Act. Section 1022 of the Act provides generously that the Bureau is em-
powered to "prescribe rules and issue orders and guidance, as may be ne-
cessary or appropriate to enable [it] to administer and carry out the purpos-
es and objectives of the Federal consumer financial laws, and to prevent
evasions thereof."'10 5 In exercising this authority, however, the Act directs
the Bureau to weigh "the potential benefits and costs to consumers and
covered persons, including the potential reduction of access by consumers
to consumer financial products or services resulting from such rule," as
well as the impact of these rules on "covered persons," and the impact of
these rules on "consumers in rural areas."'10 6 The Bureau is required, dur-
ing the comment process specified in the Administrative Procedure Act,1°7
to "consult with the appropriate prudential regulators or other Federal
agencies" as to the rule's "consistency with prudential, market, or systemic
objectives administered by such agencies."10 8  While this obligation to
"consult" does not give these prudential regulators veto power over rules
promulgated by the Bureau,10 9 the Council can overturn and "set aside" a
final regulation prescribed by the Bureau, but only if the Council decides
"that the regulation or provision [thereof] would put the safety and sound-
ness of the United States banking system or the stability of the financial
system of the United States at risk."110 Where covered persons are not sub-
104. Id. § 1021(b).
105. Id. § 1022(b)(1).
106. Id. § 1022(b)(2)(A)(i)-(ii).
107. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006).
108. Dodd-Frank Act, § 1022(b)(2)(B).
109. The Dodd-Frank Act makes clear that, with limited exceptions, the Bureau enjoys
"exclusive authority" to prescribe rules over the Federal consumer financial laws. Id. §
1022(b)(4)(A).
110. Id. § 1023(a). Agencies-that is, prudential regulators "represented by a member of
the Council"--may petition the Council in writing to stay the effectiveness of a regulation
promulgated by the Bureau if the "member agency" has attempted in good faith "to work
with the Bureau to resolve concerns regarding the effect of the rule on the safety and sound-
ness of the United States banking system or the stability of the financial system of the Unit-
ed States." Id. § 1023(b)(1)(A). In this event, the agency can petition the Council "not later
than 10 days after the date on which the regulation has been published in the Federal Regis-
ter." Id. § 1023(b)(1)(B). The Council can stay the effectiveness of the regulation for as
long as ninety days. Id. § 1023(c). "A decision by the Council to set aside a regulation pre-
scribed by the Bureau, or provision thereof, shall render such regulation, or provision the-
reof, unenforceable." Id. § 1023(b)(4)(A).
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ject to prudential regulation by a member agency, the Bureau has jurisdic-
tion to promulgate regulations and otherwise supervise nondepository cov-
ered persons, such as mortgage brokers and payday lenders."' Even this
grant of jurisdiction is conditioned upon the Bureau's consultation with the
FTC prior to issuing a rule "to define covered persons subject to this sec-
tion."1 12 And, again, regulation is subject to a cost-benefit analysis that
would require the Bureau to assess "the risks posed to consumers in the re-
levant product markets and geographic markets" in light of "the asset size
of the covered person," "the volume of the transactions involving consumer
financial products or services," "the risks to consumers created by the pro-
vision of such consumer financial products or services," "the extent to
which such institutions are subject to oversight by State authorities for con-
sumer protection," and other factors determined to be relevant." 3 As far as
enforcement of federal consumer financial laws against these nondeposito-
ry covered persons, the Act directs the Bureau and the FTC to "negotiate an
agreement for coordinating" their enforcement actions.' 14
Despite the coordination and consultation required of the Bureau, the
Dodd-Frank Act provides that, with limited exceptions, "the Bureau shall
have the exclusive authority to prescribe rules, issue guidance, conduct ex-
aminations, require reports, or issue exemptions" relating to nondepository
covered persons. 115 The biggest exception to the Bureau's exclusive au-
thority consists of a broad limitation on the Bureau's jurisdiction to exer-
cise rulemaking, supervisory, enforcement, or other authority over mer-
chants, retailers, and other sellers of nonfinancial goods or services unless
they are "engaged in offering or providing any consumer financial product
or service" or are otherwise subject to the consumer financial laws "for
which authorities are transferred" to the Bureau by the Act.116 Moreover,
111. Id. § 1024(a)(1). The Act defines a "covered person" as "any person that engages in
offering or providing a consumer financial product or service" and "any affiliate of [such
person] if such affiliate acts as a service provider to such person." Id. § 1002(6). It further
defines "financial product or service" broadly, id. § 1002(15), and distinguishes between
"covered persons," who are already subject to regulation by OCC, NCUA, or some other
financial regulator, and "nondespository covered persons," who are not so regulated. Id. §
1024.
112. Id. § 1024(a)(2).
113. Id. § 1024(b)(2).
114. Id. § 1024(c)(3)(A) (requiring this coordination agreement to include "procedures
for notice to the other agency, where feasible, prior to initiating a civil action to enforce any
Federal law regarding the offering or provision of consumer financial products or services").
115. Id. § 1024(d).
116. Id. § 1027(a)(1). There are also exceptions relating to real estate brokerage activi-
ties, manufactured home retailers, accountants and tax preparers, lawyers, insurance compa-
nies and other "persons regulated by a state insurance regulator," employee benefit and
compensation plans," persons regulated by state securities commissions, the SEC, CFTC,
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the Bureau "may not exercise any rulemaking, supervisory, enforcement or
any other authority" over car dealers that are "predominantly engaged in
the sale and servicing of motor vehicles, the leasing and servicing of ve-
hicles, or both."'1 17 The Act also specifies that, regardless of the scope of
its jurisdiction, the Bureau does not have authority "to establish a usury
limit applicable to an extension of credit offered or made by a covered per-
son to a consumer, unless explicitly authorized by law." '118 Moreover,
while there are procedural limits imposed, the Bureau is expressly autho-
rized by the Act to study and thereafter restrict mandatory, pre-dispute arbi-
tration clauses in agreements in consumer financial transactions.
19
As noted above, the Act specifies in excruciating detail whether the Bu-
reau or another agency is to regulate consumer financial products and ser-
vices. Despite this jurisdictional detail, the Act says relatively little about
the substantive breadth of the Bureau's rulemaking authority. The Act
provides that the Bureau can "issu[e] rules, orders, and guidance imple-
menting Federal consumer financial law,"1 20 but, other than to note that it
generally cannot impose usury restrictions, the Act is unclear as to what
limits, if any, exist on the Bureau's broad grant of rulemaking authority in
this regard.
In part, this ambiguity arises because there are several different state-
ments of the Bureau's rulemaking authority in the Act, some broader than
others. Subtitle B sets forth the general powers of the Bureau and begins
with the statement that the Bureau "shall seek to implement" and "enforce
Federal consumer financial law" with the purpose of "ensuring that all con-
sumers have access to markets for consumer financial products and servic-
es" and that these markets are "fair, transparent, and competitive."1 21 Spe-
cifically with regard to the Bureau's rulemaking authority, it provides that
the Director "may prescribe rules and issue orders and guidance, as may be
necessary or appropriate to enable the Bureau to administer and carry out
the purposes and objectives of the Federal consumer financial laws, and to
prevent evasions thereof."' 122 This is as broad a statement of rulemaking
authority as contained in the TILA. 123 The Supreme Court has construed
Farm Credit Administration, and activities relating to charitable contributions. Id. § 1027(b)-
(n).
117. Id. § 1029.
118. Id. § 1027(o).
119. Id. § 1028.
120. Id. § 1021(c)(5).
121. Id. § 1021(a).
122. Id. § 1022(b)(1).
123. Section 105 of TILA provides that the Federal Reserve Board is authorized to pre-
scribe regulations "to carry out [its] purposes," and "may provide for such adjustments and
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similar statements of broad delegation of rulemaking authority to require
courts generally to defer to regulations promulgated under this authority so
long as they are "reasonably related" to the "purposes of the enabling legis-
lation." '124 But what are the purposes of the Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act? 25 And are there other limitations on the Bureau's
rulemaking authority that undermine this broad, general delegation?
In various places, the Act qualifies and explicates the Bureau's authority
to promulgate rules that may be "necessary and appropriate" to implement
the purposes of the Act. For example, as noted above, the Act specifies
various entities outside the scope of the regulatory jurisdiction--car deal-
ers, and the like.'1 6 But specifying the scope of persons covered by the Act
should not be viewed as undermining the Bureau's regulatory authority
over those entities that clearly fit within the scope of the Bureau's jurisdic-
tion. Line drawing should not be viewed as diluting its authority over those
that fit within the lines.
Similarly, the Act provides that, "[i]n prescribing a rule under the Feder-
al consumer financial laws," the Bureau should weigh the potential costs
and benefits of the rule to consumers and the marketplace, as well as the
potential impact of the rule on the market-especially markets in rural
exceptions for any class of transactions, as in the judgment of the Board are necessary or
proper to effectuate the purposes of [the Act], to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof,
or to facilitate compliance therewith." 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006).
124. The Supreme Court has, on several occasions, interpreted this provision to grant ex-
tensive deference to the Fed. Indeed,
[w]here the empowering provision of a statute states simply that the agency
may "make ... such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions of this Act," we have held that the validity of a regulation
promulgated thereunder will be sustained so long as it is "reasonably related
to the purposes of the enabling legislation."
Mourning v. Family Pub. Serv., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973) (quoting Thorpe v. Hous. Auth.
of City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1969)).
125. A distinct and equally important questions also lurks here: Is the Bureau's rulemak-
ing authority limited by subsequent statements in the Act in a way that permits courts to rule
that the Bureau exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating some regulation, or is this
determination exclusively reserved for the Council? Section 1022(b)(4)(B) of the Dodd-
Frank Act seems to provide that courts should defer to the Bureau so long as its exercise of
rulemaking authority is "reasonably related" to the purposes of the Act. It provides that,
[n]otwithstanding any power granted to any Federal agency or to the Council un-
der this title ... the deference that a court affords to the Bureau with respect to a
determination by the Bureau regarding the meaning or interpretation of any provi-
sion of a Federal consumer financial law shall be applied as if the Bureau were the
only agency authorized to apply, enforce, interpret, or administer the provisions of
such Federal consumer financial law.
Dodd-Frank Act, § 1022(b)(4)(B).
126. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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areas.1 27 But courts and Congress have increasingly required administra-
tive agencies to justify their regulatory action according to similar cost-
benefit analyses.' 28 That an administrative agency is held to various proce-
dural requirements, including obligations to weigh the costs and benefits of
a regulation, should not be viewed to undermine courts' obligations to de-
fer to the agency's (or the Bureau's) administrative expertise.' 29
Finally, Subtitle C of the Act attempts to specify the scope of the subject
matter of the Bureau's rulemaking authority with greater detail. Related to
the Bureau's express authority to, among other things, ensure that "con-
sumers are protected from unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices
and from discrimination,"' 30 the Act provides that the Bureau "may pre-
scribe rules applicable to a covered person or service provider indentifying
as unlawful, unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices in connection
with any transaction with a consumer for a consumer financial product or
service, or the offering of a consumer financial product or service."' 13' It
goes on to define, through exclusion, the terms "unfair" and "abusive."' 
32
The Act specifies that the Bureau "shall have no authority" to declare an
act or practice to be "unfair" unless it has a "reasonable basis" to conclude
that:
(A) the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers; and
(B) such substantial injury is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
consumers or to competition.
133
As it relates to a finding by the Bureau that an act or practice is abusive, the
Act imposes a slightly different standard of proof, requiring the Bureau to
find that the act or practice:
(1) materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a
term or condition or a consumer financial product or service; or
(2) takes unreasonable advantage of-
127. Dodd Frank Act, § 1022(b)(2)(A).
128. See, e.g., COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, EcoNoMIc AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPEC-
TIVES (Matthew D. Adler & Eric Posner eds., 2001).
129. Id.
130. Dodd-Frank Act, § 1021(b)(2).
131. Id. § 1031(b).
132. Id. §§ 103 1(c), (d). Presumably, the term "deceptive" is sufficiently well understood
to require no additional explication in the statute.
133. Id. § 1031 (c)(1). Moreover, this section continues: "In determining whether an act
or practice is unfair, the Bureau may consider established public policies as evidence to be
considered with all other evidence. Such public policy considerations may not serve as a
primary basis for such determinations." Id. § 1031 (c)(2).
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(A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the material
risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service;
(B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the consumer
in selecting or using a consumer financial product or service; or
(C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person to act in
the interests of the consumer. 1
34
Clearly, Congress is looking with this language to define the open-ended
terms "unfair" and "abusive," but is it also more broadly looking to limit
the Bureau's rulemaking authority in this context? We think not. This lan-
guage merely codifies existing agency interpretations of the terms, but does
not limit in any way current understanding or practices. The definition of
"unfair," set by the Act, tracks nearly word for word the standard of proof
the FTC is required to meet in finding that an act or practice constitutes an
unfair method of competition. 135 Similarly, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) follows this standard in determining whether covered
financial institutions have engaged in unfair acts or practices. 136 In addi-
tion, the definition of "abusive" set by the Act resembles agency guidelines
regarding the meaning of "deceptive" practices, 137 although the FDIC
Compliance Manual considers the deceptiveness of an act or practice from
the "perspective of a reasonable consumer," which the Act does not re-
quire. 13
8
134. Id. § 1031(d).
135. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006).
136. The FDIC Compliance Manual provides the following:
In order to determine whether a practice is "unfair," the FDIC will consider
whether the practice "causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers
which is not reasonably avoided by consumers themselves and not outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition." By adhering to this te-
net, the FDIC will take action to address conduct that falls well below the high
standards of business practice expected of banks and the parties affiliated with
them.
FDIC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, CHAPTER VII. ABUSIVE PRACTICES (June 2006) [hereinafter
FDIC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL] (citing 15 U.S.C. § 45(n)), available at http://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/compliance/manual/pdf/VII-1.1.pdf. The Treasury applies the same standard.
See OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, EXAMINATION HANDBOOK (2010), available at http://
www.ots.treas.gov/_files/422369.pdf.
137. See FDIC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 136; see also OFFICE OF THRIFT SU-
PERVISION, supra note 136 ("To correct deceptive trade practices, the FDIC will take action
against representations, omissions, or practices that are likely to mislead consumers acting
reasonably under the circumstances, and are likely to cause such consumers harm. The
FDIC will focus on material misrepresentations, i.e., those that affect choices made by con-
sumers because such misrepresentations are most likely to cause consumers financial
harm.").
138. FDIC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 136 ("In determining whether an act or
practice is misleading, the consumer's interpretation of or reaction to the representation,
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Nonetheless, the Act should not be construed to authorize the Bureau to
exercise its rulemaking authority only to identify unfair, deceptive, or ab-
usive acts or practices. While section 1031 of the Act expressly authorizes
the Bureau to promulgate such regulations, 139 section 1022 more broadly
authorizes it to "prescribe rules and issue orders and guidance, as may be
necessary or appropriate to enable the Bureau to administer and carry out
the purposes and objectives of the Federal consumer financial laws, and to
prevent evasions thereof."' 140 And, the Act's statement of purposes and ob-
jectives is not limited to protecting consumers from "unfair, deceptive or
abusive acts and practices and from discrimination,"'' 41 although this power
is included. The Act also provides that the Bureau should ensure that "con-
sumers are provided with timely and understandable information to make
responsible decisions about financial transactions" and that the "markets
for consumer financial products and services operate transparently and effi-
ciently to facilitate access and innovation. '142
Consistent with this reading of the breadth of the Bureau's rulemaking
authority, section 1032 permits the Bureau to "ensure that the features of
any consumer financial product or service ... are fully, accurately, and ef-
fectively disclosed to consumers in a manner that permits consumers to un-
derstand the costs, benefits, and risks associated with the product or ser-
vice, in light of the facts and circumstances." 143 This provision correlates
to the statement in section 1021 that the Bureau should ensure that "con-
sumers are provided with timely and understandable information to make
responsible decisions about financial transactions."1 44 Similarly, sections
1033 and 1034 explicate the Bureau's responsibilities to educate consumers
and monitor consumers' complaints, as set forth in section 1021(c)(1), (2),
and (3).
omission, or practice must be reasonable under the circumstances. The test is whether the
consumer's expectations or interpretation are reasonable in light of the claims made. When
representations or marketing practices are targeted to a specific audience, such as the elderly
or the financially unsophisticated, the standard is based upon the effects of the act or prac-
tice on a reasonable member of that group.").
139. Dodd-Frank Act, § 1031(b).
140. Id. § 1022(b).
141. Id. § 1021(b)(2).
142. Id. § 1021(b)(1), (5).
143. Id. § 1032(a). This section also permits the Bureau to issue model forms, so long as
the form has been "validated through consumer testing." Id. § 1032(b). Indeed, the Act re-
quires the Bureau to "propose for public comment rules and model disclosures that combine
the disclosures required under [TILA and RESPA] into a single, integrated disclosure for
mortgage loan transactions." Id. § 1032(f). Use by lenders and other covered persons of a
model form promulgated by the Bureau under these sections "shall be deemed to be in com-
pliance with the disclosure requirements of this section." Id. § 1032(d).
144. Id. § 1021(b)(1).
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Moreover, the Dodd-Frank Act transfers jurisdiction to the Bureau of
regulatory authority over a broad range of consumer financial protection
functions from the Federal Reserve Board, the OCC, and OTS, and even
the FTC.' 45 The Act amends a long list of federal consumer financial pro-
tection legislation to substitute the Bureau for pre-existing regulatory juris-
diction. 46 Finally, Title XIV of the Act adds rulemaking authority to the
Fed's list of responsibilities;147 the transfer provisions should shift even this
newly conferred jurisdiction to the Bureau as of the "transfer date."
C. A Balancing Act
We read the Dodd-Frank Act as balancing consumer financial protection
with market concerns for liquidity, safety, and soundness based on several
structural aspects of the Act. First, structuring the Act as omnibus legisla-
tion that combined the creation of a Bureau of Consumer Financial Protec-
tion with broad reform of regulation of the financial services and capital
markets suggests that interests in consumer financial protection cannot be
separated from market interests in the supply of such products. Moreover,
pairing the creation of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (in
Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act) with prescriptive regulation of predatory
mortgages (in Title XIV of the Dodd-Frank Act) signals in the structure of
the statute itself both the breadth and depth of the Bureau's regulatory au-
thority.
Second, the Act's consolidation of jurisdiction over consumer financial
protection with a single regulatory entity, and the placement of that entity
as a Bureau within the Federal Reserve System, further signals the interre-
latedness of concerns for the demand and supply of consumer financial
products. Creation of an independent consumer financial protection regula-
tory entity provides assurances that consumer financial protection will not
be ignored by the agencies with jurisdiction to regulate actors in the various
financial services industries; positioning that entity within the aegis of the
Federal Reserve System provides additional assurances that concerns re-
garding liquidity in the market and the soundness of market actors will in-
fluence choice among possible methods of regulation of consumer financial
products.
In directing the Bureau, at least inferentially, to balance concerns for
consumer protection, safety and soundness, and liquidity, has Congress
asked the Bureau to do the impossible? Efforts to promote consumer fi-
145. Dodd-Frank Act, tits. X-F.
146. Id at tits. X-H.
147. Id. § 1402(a)(2).
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nancial protection have long been met with arguments that since the effect
of prescriptive regulation is to reduce liquidity (and also perhaps innova-
tion) in the marketplace, disclosure regulation should be preferred. Con-
gress had, indeed, more frequently adopted disclosure regulation than regu-
lation that prohibits financial products or terms. 1 48
Our contention that the Act should be read to require the Bureau to con-
sider not simply consumer protection concerns, but also concerns for li-
quidity in the marketplace and the safety and soundness of financial institu-
tions, is not to argue that the Bureau should promulgate only or even
predominantly disclosure regulation. First, the recent subprime mortgage
crisis demonstrates that favoring liquidity over consumer protection con-
cerns in all contexts may come at the price of the safety and soundness of
financial actors. Second, and perhaps more importantly, a directive to bal-
ance concerns for liquidity with concerns for the protection of consumer
borrowers is not-and should not be construed as-a guarantee that liquidi-
ty levels should remain stable in the face of the new regulation nor that on-
ly regulation enhancing liquidity in the marketplace should be adopted. A
concern for ensuring the movement of financial products between and
among financial actors is distinct from a concern for protecting, at all costs,
the dollar values of financial instruments that change hands in the financial
markets. Finally, interests in consumer protection vary depending upon the
particular purpose at issue. Regulation looking to alleviate deception or
abuses in the market may look very different from regulation seeking to en-
sure that "all consumers have access to markets for consumer financial
products and services" and that these markets are "fair, transparent, and
competitive." 149
In the next Part, we further explore the scope of the Bureau's regulatory
authority. Title XIV regulates mortgage originators and mortgage lenders
and their assignees. With both sorts of prescriptive regulation, the Dodd-
Frank Act grants regulatory authority to the Board (but really the Bureau)
to effectuate its terms. In doing so, the Act carefully balances concerns for
consumer protection with interests in liquidity and the soundness of market
actors.
148. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 302, 401,404, 409, 802, Pub. L. No. 107-
204, 116 Stat. 745.
149. Dodd-Frank Act, § 1021.
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III. SUBSTANCE: PROVISIONS FROM THE MORTGAGE REFORM AND
THE ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING ACT
Although the Dodd Bill appeared to eliminate prescriptive regulation
from the face of congressional reform of the financial markets, substance
crept back in during the conference committee. Specifically, Title XIV of
the Dodd-Frank Act includes the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory
Lending Act provisions that the Frank Bill incorporated from the earlier
Miller Bill. This section of the Act includes eight subtitles: (i) residential
mortgage loan origination standards; (ii) minimum standards for mortgag-
es; (iii) high-cost mortgages; (iv) Office of Housing Counseling; (v) mort-
gage servicing; (vi) appraisal activities; (vii) mortgage resolution and mod-
ification; and (viii) miscellaneous provisions. Only the subtitles relating to
residential mortgage loan origination standards and minimum standards for
mortgages changed much; the remaining subtitles were merely moved,
nearly intact, from their earlier placement in the Miller and Frank Bills.
Nonetheless, the conference committee did make important changes to the
provisions in the first two subtitles. These provisions, especially those im-
posing assignee liability for failure to meet the standards set for residential
mortgage origination, had been among the most controversial provisions in
the Frank Bill. They were also the most important provisions, in our view,
for effectuating a sorting between securitizable safe mortgages and non-
securitizable exotics.
Subtitle A, setting residential mortgage loan origination standards, con-
tains definitional provisions, but fewer of them than had appeared in the
Miller Bill. Carving back on the number of definitions was not just an ef-
fort by the conference committee to simplify residential mortgage loan ori-
gination standards, but rather signals several important changes between
the Miller Bill and the Dodd-Frank Act. First, "securitizers" are not de-
fined because the Dodd-Frank Act imposes its standards only on "credi-
tors" and "assignees," but not "securitizers." Second, the "federal banking
agencies" are not defined in the Dodd-Frank Act, because the Act confers
rulemaking authority in this section on the Board and not a broader range
of federal banking agencies (that would have included not only the Board,
but also OCC, FDIC, NCUA, and others).
More than merely definitional, Subtitle A also sets standards, but the
standards that it sets for mortgage originators are substantially watered
down from those included in the earlier Miller and Frank Bills. Important-
ly, section 1402 of the Dodd-Frank Act cuts back substantially on the duty
of care set for mortgage originators. The Act requires mortgage originators
to be qualified, registered, and licensed according to applicable state and
federal law, and to include on all loan documents "any unique identifier of
712 Vol. XXXVIII
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the mortgage originator provided by the Nationwide Mortgage Licensing
System and Registry,"' 50 but unlike the Miller and Frank Bills does not re-
quire mortgage originators to make "full, complete and timely disclosure"
to consumers of information regarding the comparative costs and benefits
of the residential mortgage offered, nature of the relationship between the
originator and the consumer, or of "any relevant conflicts of interest be-
tween the originator and the consumer."
' 151
Removing from the Act obligations for mortgage originators to provide
disclosure to consumers is perplexing to us. Why shouldn't mortgage ori-
ginators be required to tell consumers that they are obliged to act in the best
interests of lenders, if that is the economic reality of the situation? The de-
letion is especially troubling because we have elsewhere described mort-
gage originators as potentially effective in protecting consumers' interests
in residential mortgage transactions.152 The failure to set high standards for
mortgage originators strikes us as a disappointing missed opportunity.
Even more perplexing is the removal from the Dodd-Frank Act of earlier
provisions that would have imposed on mortgage originators the obligation
to present to consumers "a range of residential mortgage loan products,"
each of which is "appropriate to the consumer's existing circumstances,
based on information known by or provided in good faith to the origina-
tor."' 153 Because the Miller Bill defined "appropriate" to relate to a con-
sumer's "ability to pay,"'154 it correlated the standards applicable to mort-
gage originators and mortgage creditors. This correlation of standards was
critically important to the practical implementation of the Miller Bill's
standard since, often, a mortgage originator is at the same time a mortgage
creditor at least for the short period between mortgage origination and the
distribution of that mortgage to a securitization vehicle.
Remaining in the Dodd-Frank Act, however, are provisions of the earlier
Miller and Frank Bills that granted rulemaking authority over the duty of
care set for mortgage originators. As noted above, however, the House
Bills would have vested the "federal banking agencies" with this rulemak-
ing authority 55 and the Dodd-Frank Act, on its face, vests this authority in
150. Id. § 1402(a) (amending TILA to include section 129B regarding mortgage loan ori-
gination).
151. Miller Bill, H.R. 1728, 111 th Cong. § 102(a) (1st Sess. 2009) (which would have
amended TILA to include a much more demanding new section 129B regarding mortgage
loan origination).
152. See Janger & Block-Lieb, supra note 2.
153. H.R. 1728 § 102.
154. See supra notes 14-49 and accompanying text.
155. H.R. 1728 § 102(a).
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the "Board"' 56 (in practice, due to other sections of the Dodd-Frank Act,
the Bureau accedes to this rulemaking authority of the Board).'57 In our
opinion, this rulemaking authority should be construed to permit the Board
(but really the Bureau) to promulgate regulations requiring mortgage origi-
nators to provide some or all of the disclosure information cut from the
House Bills' requirements. We are hopeful that the Bureau will have the
political will to regulate mortgage originators effectively, given the Act's
efforts to insulate the Bureau from congressional budget cutting and other
consequences.
Regulation of mortgage originators should not, however, come only in
the form of disclosure regulation. Enhanced disclosure of the sort pro-
moted in the Miller and Frank Bills may not have had its intended effect;
behavioral decision research suggests that individuals rely too heavily on
experts, even where disclosure information refutes the expertise or reveals
conflicting interests held by experts. 58 Moreover, regulation should be
adopted to account for the close and often overlapping relationships be-
tween mortgage originators and mortgage creditors.
Importantly, section 1403 of the Dodd-Frank Act prohibits mortgage
originators from receiving fees that would encourage them to steer con-
sumers to mortgages that are either higher priced or that contain certain
mortgage terms. It also authorizes the Board (but really the Bureau) to pre-
scribe regulations prohibiting mortgage originators from steering consum-
ers to residential mortgages that the consumer "lacks a reasonable ability to
repay," "has predatory characteristics or effects," or is not a "qualified
mortgage."' 159 This provision also authorizes the Board (but really the Bu-
reau) to promulgate regulations prohibiting "abusive or unfair lending prac-
tices that promote disparities among consumers of equal credit worthiness
but of different race, ethnicity, gender or age," as well as practices by
mortgage originators to mischaracterize the credit history of the consumer,
or the value of the residential property secured by the mortgage. 160
Section 1405 of the Act expands the Board's (but really the Bureau's)
rulemaking authority, whether as applied to mortgage originators or other
entities more generally, to permit them to "prohibit or condition terms, acts
156. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 1402(a)(2).
157. Id. §§ 1401-98.
158. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclo-
sure 3-4 (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 516, 2010), available at http:
//papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid= 1567284.
159. Dodd-Frank Act, § 1403 (amending TILA section 129B).
160. Id
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or practices relating to residential mortgage loans" found to be "abusive,
unfair, deceptive, [or] predatory" with the goal of ensuring that "affordable
mortgage credit remains available to consumers."'
161
Section 1404 of the Dodd-Frank Act imposes liability on mortgage ori-
ginators for violations of TILA (as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act) and
any regulations promulgated under it, but provides that the maximum lia-
bility that may be imposed against a mortgage originator under this provi-
sion
shall not exceed the greater of actual damages or an amount equal to 3
times the total amount of direct and indirect compensation or gain ac-
cruing to the mortgage originator in connection with the residential mort-
gage loan involved in the violation, plus the costs to the consumer of the
action, including a reasonable attorney's fee.1
62
While this section leaves open the possibility of statutory damages against
mortgage originators who violate the Act or the rules promulgated under it,
these damages are set at levels likely only to sting but not put violators out
of business.
Subtitle B to the Dodd-Frank Act sets federal minimum standards for
residential mortgages, but again these standards are a revised version of the
original standards set in the earlier House Bills. Unlike the changes made
to Subtitle A, which largely eviscerate mortgage originators' obligations,
the changes made to Subtitle B reflect efforts to balance consumer protec-
tion concerns with market-oriented concerns for liquidity, safety, and
soundness. Much of substance is left in these provisions, although more
could be done.
Section 1411 of the Dodd-Frank Act sets minimum federal standards for
residential mortgage loans relating to consumers' "ability to repay" such
mortgages. Specifically, the Act provides that
no creditor may make a residential mortgage loan unless the creditor
makes a reasonable and good faith determination based on verified and
documented information that, at the time the loan is consummated, the
consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan, according to its
terms, and all applicable taxes, insurance (including mortgage guarantee
insurance), and assessments. 163
The Act indicates that a determination of a consumer's ability to repay a
residential mortgage loan should include looking into the consumer's credit
history, current income and expenses, future income that the consumer is
161. Id. § 1405 (further amending TILA section 129B).
162. Id. § 1404 (further amending TILA section 129B).
163. Id. § 1411 (a)(2) (amending TILA to add a new section 129C).
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"reasonably assured of receiving," employment status, and other factors.164
It further provides that a creditor should verify the consumer's income "or
assets that such creditor relies on" so that the creditor can determine the
consumer's repayment ability. 165 Statutorily imposed underwriting stan-
dards of such a basic nature might seem intrusive, 166 except in the context
of reports of substantial numbers of NINA and NINJA loans for which in-
come and asset verification was absent from mortgage terms or practices.
Omitted from the Dodd-Frank Act are provisions found in earlier House
Bills requiring refinanced mortgages, at a minimum, to provide a "net tang-
ible benefit" to the consumer. 167
As noted above, these minimum mortgage underwriting standards ex-
pressly restrict decision making by creditors, but other provisions make
clear that the obligations are binding on assignees of residential mortgage
loans as well. A violation of the "ability to pay" requirements provides a
defense to foreclosure. 168 Unlike in the earlier Bills, rescission is not an
available remedy; 169 nonetheless, actual damages and statutory damages
can be asserted against assignees by way of a claim in recoupment. 7 0
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Indeed, because federal underwriting standards of such a basic nature could water
down stronger underwriting requirements imposed by financial regulators or other financial
regulation, the conference committee added section 141 1(a)(1) to the Dodd-Frank Act,
which provides that "[n]o regulation, order, or guidance issued by the Bureau under this title
shall be construed as requiring a depository institution to apply mortgage underwriting stan-
dards that do not meet the minimum underwriting standards required by the appropriate
prudential regulator of the depository institution." Id. § 141 l(a)(1).
167. H.R. 1728, 111 th Cong. § 202 (2009) (amending TILA section 129B).
168. See Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.34(a)(4), 226.35(b)(1) (2010).
169. The primary differences between Subtitle B of the Dodd-Frank Act and similar pro-
visions in the earlier House Bills are the remedies that follow from a failure to comply with
the underwriting standards or the safe harbor provisions identified in those places. In addi-
tion to any other liability extended by TILA, the Miller and Frank Bills would have permit-
ted consumers to rescind residential mortgage loans that either did not conform to the mini-
mum underwriting standards set by the Bills, or satisfy the requirements of a "qualified
mortgage," subject to the right of creditors, assignees, and securitizers to "cure" under the
terms of those Bills. This right of rescission (subject to a right of cure) is altogether absent
in the Dodd-Frank Act, deleted as a part of the deliberations of the conference committee.
170. By contrast, the Dodd-Frank Act retains from the Miller and Frank Bills the notion
that non-conformity with either the minimum underwriting standards or the safe harbor en-
titles a consumer to a new federalized defense in any subsequent foreclosure on the mort-
gage debt. Section 1413 of the Act provides that "when a creditor, assignee, or other holder
of a residential mortgage loan or anyone acting on behalf of such creditor, assignee, or hold-
er," brings a judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure action regarding such loan, "a consumer may
assert a violation by the creditor" of the underwriting standards, including a failure to satisfy
the safe harbor, set by the Act, "as a matter of defense by recoupment or set off without re-
gard for the time limit on a private action for damages." Dodd-Frank Act, § 1413 (amending
TILA section 130).
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The content of the "ability to pay" requirement is implemented through
the availability of safe harbor provisions that grant a rebuttable presump-
tion of ability to pay imposed under section 1412 of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Section 1412 provides that "[a]ny creditor with respect to any residential
mortgage loan, and any assignee of such loan subject to liability under this
title, may presume that the loan has met the [minimum underwriting] re-
quirements of subsection (a), if the loan is a qualified mortgage."
17
'
In this section, the Act goes on the define a "qualified mortgage" as ex-
cluding most negatively-amortizing residential mortgage loans, as well as
residential mortgage loans with certain balloon payments, certain point and
fees, and certain reverse mortgages.' 72 A qualified mortgage is defined to
require "the income and financial resources relied upon to qualify the obli-
gors on the loan" to be "verified and documented.- 173 The terms also ex-
pressly include fixed rate loans "for which the underwriting process is
based on a payment schedule that fully amortizes the loan over the loan
term[,]" and adjustable rate loans "for which the underwriting is based on
the maximum rate permitted under the loan during the first 5 years, and a
payment schedule that fully amortizes the loan over the loan term."174
While the details of the language in this section differ from the details
found in the earlier House Bills, in substance, the term "qualified mort-
gage" in the Dodd-Frank Act is nearly identical to the same term in the
Miller and Frank Bills.175 Moreover, rulemaking authority to implement
this safe harbor is nearly identical in the Dodd-Frank Act and the earlier
House Bills, except that, as noted above, the Dodd-Frank Act vests this au-
thority in the Board (but really in the Bureau) rather than the federal bank-
ing agencies.
Unlike the earlier House Bills, the Dodd-Frank Act limits the extent of
this defense to the amount to which the consumer would be entitled by way
of actual or statutory damages, plus costs and fees, for "a valid claim
brought in an original action against the creditor." 176 In a subsequent sec-
tion of the Dodd-Frank Act, the remedies available for violation of TILA,
including presumably violations of the new minimum underwriting stan-
dards for residential mortgages, are roughly doubled (although never very
171. Id. § 1412 (amending TILA section 129C).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Compare id., with H.R. 3915, 110th Cong. § 203(c)(3)(B) (2d Sess. 2008), and H.R.
1728, 11 1th Cong. § 203(c)(2)(A) (1st Sess. 2009).
176. Dodd-Frank Act, § 1412.
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generous). 177 The remainder of Subtitle B is virtually identical to similar
provisions in the Miller and Frank Bills.
Changes to the liability provisions of the earlier House Bills would
seem, on their face, to undermine the remedies available for violation of the
minimum underwriting standards. We think this reading of the conference
committee's revisions to the mortgage reform and anti-predatory loan ori-
gination standards would be excessively harsh because it would ignore the
practical consequences of the remedies that remain in the Dodd-Frank Act.
Even before amendments added by the Dodd-Frank Act, TILA provided
consumers with a right to rescind certain home-equity mortgage transac-
tions within three business days following consummation of the transac-
tions; 178 if the home-equity lender does not provide the notices and disclo-
sures required by TILA, consumers have three years from consummation to
rescind.'79 Rescission would unwind the transaction, avoiding both the
mortgage and the unpaid portions of the related debt; the consumer could
either repay the proceeds of the violating loan or turn over the mortgaged
property to the creditor. 180 In a flat real estate market, rescission would
leave both the consumer and lender in the position they were in before the
offending mortgage transaction was entered into. In a real estate market in
which property values diminished since the inception of the loan, however,
the lender would be left "holding the bag" for that loss. 18 1 Moreover, TI-
LA's remedy of rescission was limited to home-equity loans, but not resi-
dential mortgage transactions in which a mortgage is taken in a consumer's
principal residence to finance the acquisition or initial construction of the
dwelling.182 Unwinding a home equity loan is a far simpler proposition
than rescission of a residential mortgage.
In any event, the defense to foreclosure that remains in the Dodd-Frank
Act holds important consequences especially for assignees. If the defense
177. Id. § 1416 (amending TILA section 129C).
178. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3) (2010). This three-year period is cut short in
the event the consumer borrowers sell the property within this period.
179. Id.
180. DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CONSUMER LAW 637-38 (5th
ed. 2006) ("In theory, the rescission procedure is simple.... The consumer gives the notice
of rescission; the creditor has 20 days to return the consumer's money and cancel the mort-
gage; the consumer then tenders back the money or property received; the creditor takes it
within 20 days of this tender or forfeits the right to ever receive it."); see also Gerasta v. Hi-
bernia Nat'l Bank, 575 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1978).
181. And in a real estate market in which property values have increased since the incep-
tion of the loan, the consumer would weigh the loss of equity against the loss of the federal
defense in any foreclosure action.
182. 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(f) (closed-end home equity loans); see also id. § 226.15 (provid-
ing similar rules applicable to open-end home equity loans).
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can be asserted against a holder, even a holder in due course, then purchas-
er/assignees will be forced to monitor compliance with the minimum mort-
gage origination standards.
Finally, the rulemaking authority that the Dodd-Frank Act vests in the
Board (but really the Bureau) provides added assurance to us that the con-
sequences of these remedial provisions will have teeth-big, scary canine
teeth-in the market for Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities. This is
not to say that we think the Bureau should or would promulgate regulations
strengthening the remedial provisions removed from the earlier House Bills
providing consumers with rights of rescission, but surely it could. Our
thinking in this regard is very much colored by our perception of the regu-
latory architecture of the Dodd-Frank Act, and thus of the scope of the
rulemaking authority of the Bureau created by the Act.
CONCLUSION
There is much to applaud in the Dodd-Frank Act with regard to its
reform of regulation of the market for home loans. Its creation of the Bu-
reau, regulation of mortgage originators, and promulgation of federal min-
imum standards for residential mortgages are all steps in the right direction.
We hope the Dodd-Frank Act has created a regulatory template that permits
the Bureau to minimize the risks of capital markets financing for home
mortgages through standardization and simplification of the terms of "qual-
ified mortgages." Similarly, the Bureau's power to define "unfair lending
practices," and to prescribe standardized forms consistent with those prac-
tices, should give it the necessary tools for guiding mortgage originators
and mortgage lenders toward safer lending practices.
That said, there is also reason to be critical. Title XIV of the Dodd-
Frank Act is considerably weaker than the regulatory provisions that would
have been enacted under the Miller Bill. Removing the link between the
concept of a "qualified mortgage" and responsibility for consideration of
the ability of a consumer to pay that mortgage may simplify regulation of
home lending, but leave consumers without needed advice. Here and in
other places, however, we are cautiously optimistic that the Bureau, with its
broad rulemaking authority and expertise, may be able to fill in the gaps
left by Congress.
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